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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the recent trends of Islamic radicalization and ethnic nationalism in 
the southwestern Volga-Ural region of the Russian Federation.  On July 19, 2012, a radical 
Islamic sect, frustrated with regional policies hostile to Islamic fundamentalism, perpetrated an 
unprecedented terrorist attack against Muslim religious leaders in the city of Kazan, Tatarstan.  
Such deadly intra-communal violence triggered a strong military response by the Russian 
government, inciting local opposition from ethnic nationalist groups.  Through comparative 
analysis of original Russian media sources, I assess the potential threat of religious extremism 
and national separatism in the republics of Tatarstan and neighboring Bashkortostan as well as 
the government reaction to these developments.   
I conclude that the ever more forceful government response to secure the 2014 Sochi 
Olympics and resurging Islamic terrorism following the NATO withdrawal from Central Asia 
threatens to radicalize more Volga-Ural Muslim individuals.  Furthermore, though national 
separatist groups increased radical activity after the Kazan terrorist attacks, the regional 
governments of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan strategically manipulate ethnic nationalism to 
acquire greater autonomy from the federal center.  Ultimately, the majority of Tatar and Bashkir 
society generally rejects the calls for religious extremism and national separatism across 
southwestern Russia.  The results of this project contribute to the growing body of research on 
the dangers of ethnic minority conflicts for Russian internal security and the international 
community.          
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the last two decades, the international press has widely reported on the various 
ethnic minority conflicts throughout the North Caucasus in southwestern Russia.  Violence has 
particularly plagued the republics of Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Dagestan.  The Federal Security 
Service (FSB), the main domestic security agency of Russia, continues to actively pursue 
extremists in these areas.  Over 70,000 troops still remain in Chechnya today with 250,000 
troops stationed throughout the North Caucasus.1 Internal and border security represents a huge 
concern for the Russian government, especially with the upcoming 2014 Winter Olympics in the 
city of Sochi, located on the coast of the Black Sea in this unstable region.  A recently active 
warzone not surprisingly receives more attention, but the following incident suggests the call for 
armed resistance against state authority potentially stretches beyond the North Caucasus.  
 In the heart of the autonomous republic Tatarstan along the majestic Volga River, the 
grand city Kazan serves as an epicenter for economic activity southeast of Moscow, proudly 
proclaiming their government-approved title as the “Third Capital” of Russia.  The city upheld 
until recently a high reputation for being a sanctuary of religious tolerance for Orthodox 
Christians and adherents of Islam.  Such a lofty claim was brutally shattered on the morning of 
July 19, 2012.  At 11:00am, Mufti Ildus Faizov, head of the Muslim community in Kazan, left 
his home and approached his car, preparing for his regular commute to work.  Steps from his 
vehicle, a bomb was detonated in a three-part explosion that hurled Mufti Faizov backwards 
through the air.  Less than an hour earlier, Deputy Vailulla Yakupov, head of the Muslim 
Educational Department in Kazan, was shot multiple times in the lobby of his apartment 
building.  Though severely injured, Mufti Faizov survived the attack; however, the wounds 
sustained by Deputy Yakupov proved fatal, who died in his car on the way to the hospital.2   
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This well-coordinated terrorist strike shocked the religious community of Tatarstan and 
unnerved federal officials.  Initial reports speculated such action was motivated by extremists’ 
outrage over religious policies hostile to Islamic fundamentalism.  Mufti Faizov and Deputy 
Yakupov had worked to promote initiatives supporting a traditional and moderate interpretation 
of Sunni Islam, challenging the stricter tenets of Salafism, a decades-old reform movement often 
associated with jihad in the present day.  In a clear sign of the government’s apprehension, 
President Vladimir Putin immediately sent a message to political leaders in Tatarstan to express 
his concerns about the incident: “These events remind us once again that the situation in our 
country is far from ideal.  What has happened is a serious signal.”3 A few days later, a previously 
unheard of radical group called the Mujahedeen of Tatarstan claimed responsibility for the 
attacks.  President Putin initiated a swift crackdown, indiscriminately arresting dozens of Muslim 
men in search of the perpetrators.  Key ethnic nationalist groups condemned the questionable 
detentions and organized a series of protests in opposition to the government.  Amidst these 
increasing tensions, the likelihood of further conflict appeared to be rising. 
 On the morning of July 19, 2012, I was touring the iconic white and blue Qol Sharif 
Mosque, the largest mosque in Russia and a common work site of Mufti Faizov and Deputy 
Yakupov, when the car bombing and shooting occurred.  The shock of the tragedy was soon 
replaced by the nagging need to understand the why behind these atrocities.  I utilized the 
remainder of my intensive Russian language study abroad program in the neighboring city of 
Ufa, Bashkortostan to begin exploring the ramifications of the Kazan terrorist attacks.  The 
curiosity drawn from this incident ultimately served as the impetus to write this senior honors 
thesis.  Beginning with a careful review of relevant history and contemporary literature, this 
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study explores the current threat of Islamic radicalization and ethnic nationalism in the republics 
of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan as well as the government reaction to these developments. 
The phenomenological methodology of Constant Comparative Content Analysis serves 
as an effective framework for examining these topics of interest.  After a brief discussion on 
federal government interference and the natural tendency for sensationalism in the media, I 
critically review various original Russian news sources with a specific focus on four core 
categories: federal security operations, influence of religious institutions, pursuit for regional 
autonomy, and identity formation.  Analyzing these phenomena through the scope of ethnic 
nationalism and Islamic radicalization provides for more nuanced observations on the effects of 
the Kazan terrorist attacks in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan.  The following explanations establish 
the conceptual foundation for drawing conclusions from this qualitative news source data.  
A myriad of differing theories and models on the dynamics of ethnic nationalism and 
Islamic radicalization presently operate in the field of international studies.  For the purposes of 
this research, the succeeding definitions function as the litmus test for measuring the progression 
and combination of these two trends in the target areas.  Esteemed scholar Anthony D. Smith 
defines nationalism as the formation of “a named and self-defined community whose members 
cultivate common myths, memories, symbols and values, possess and disseminate a distinctive 
public culture, reside in and identify with a historical homeland, and create and disseminate 
common laws and shared customs.”4 The ethnic classification also involves emphasis on shared 
genealogical descent and perceived bonds of kinship between members of the group.5 I 
investigate these processes in the development of Tatar and Bashkir identity in addition to 
examining the impact of local intellectuals and political elites on the construction and cohesion 
of these communities.  
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The psychological process of Islamic radicalization involves a “change in beliefs, 
feelings, and behaviors in directions that increasingly justify intergroup violence and demand 
sacrifice in defense of the ingroup.”6 The aims of Muslim extremists stand in stark contrast to the 
intentions of nationalists.  Historian George L. Mosse accurately describes national 
consciousness as “a secular religion, the people worshipping themselves.”7 The self-fulfilling 
popular will and cultural individualism of nationalism represents the antithesis of religious 
fundamentalism, which moralizes the submission of the people to a one true divine authority.  
However, clear distinctions between ethnic nationalism and Islamic radicalization often blur 
when comparing the motivations and strategies of these two movements. In his book The 
Looming Tower, Lawrence Wright explains most aptly how “radicalism usually prospers in the 
gap between rising expectations and declining opportunities.”8 Though their perceived 
grievances and end goals may vary, government oppression pushes both Muslim extremists and 
ethnic nationalists to exhibit radical behavior such as political violence and separatist resistance.  
Each group frequently uses propaganda and terrorism as tools to spread their message and 
oppose a common enemy.  Religion is another common denominator, serving as a unifying 
ideological force for Muslim extremists or a source of cultural solidarity for ethnic nationalists.  I 
consider this interplay between Islamic radicalization and ethnic nationalism to determine which 
trend incites the more forceful government response and appears more effective at appealing to 
minorities in the republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan.  
After applying these foundational definitions to detailed news source analysis, I offer the 
following conclusions on the trends of Islamic radicalization and ethnic nationalism in the wake 
of the Kazan terrorist attacks as well as the government reaction to these developments.  First, 
outside of a few isolated incidents, the religious communities of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan 
8 
appear relatively stable, not increasingly radicalizing to commit political violence against local 
spiritual leaders and the state.  But the ever more forceful government response to secure the 
2014 Sochi Olympics and potentially resurging Islamic terrorism following the NATO 
withdrawal from Central Asia threaten to alienate more Volga-Ural Muslim individuals.  Second, 
though national separatist groups increased radical activity following the Kazan terrorist attacks, 
the regional governments of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan strategically manipulate ethnic 
nationalism to acquire greater autonomy from the federal center.  Ultimately, the majority of 
Tatar and Bashkir society presently rejects the calls for religious extremism and national 
separatism across southwestern Russia. 
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CHAPTER 2: RELEVANT HISTORY 
Tatarstan is located between the Volga River and the Ural Mountains in southwest 
Russia, maintaining close ties with its eastern neighbor, Bashkortostan.  The primary ethnic 
minorities serve as the namesakes for the two autonomous republics.  The Tatars and Bashkirs 
are Turkic peoples descended from the Volga Bulgars, who first arrived in the region in the 7th 
century, and other Turkic and Finnish nomadic tribes. The Bulgar State was established in the 9th 
century and adopted Islam in the 10th century.9 As the Bulgar State developed, Mongol and 
Turkic warring parties gained power throughout Central Asia.  One group in particular, the 
Tatars, earned great respect as fierce fighters and despite being nearly wiped out by the Mongols, 
their name lived on throughout history.10   
Further west in the modern day territories of Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Hungary, myriad 
tribes of Slavic peoples settled along the great waterways of the region.  According to the 
Primary Chronicle11, compiled between 1037 and 1118, the Slavs invited the invading 
Varangians, also known as the Vikings and Russes, to mediate their decades old conflicts and 
establish order in the form of an empire.  Prince Rurik and his claimed descendants consolidated 
pre-imperial Russia in the city of Novgorod in 862 A.D. that eventually extended southwest to 
the fortress of Kiev, culminating in the commonly termed kingdom of Ancient Rus.  Through a 
series of peace treaties, Ancient Rus developed a close economic relationship with the Byzantine 
Empire whose Greek culture left a strong imprint on their society, particularly in matters of 
religion.  Cyril and Methodius, two Byzantine missionaries, first traveled among the Slavs, 
spreading the tenets of Orthodoxy.  Grand Prince Vladimir eventually adopted Christianity for 
the entire Russian kingdom in the 10th century, setting the precedent for strong relations between 
the church and state.  
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As their dominion expanded east to the Volga region, the Rus often faced attacks from 
Finnish and Turkic nomadic tribes as well as the Bulgars.  It is significant to note that Orthodox 
Christianity in Ancient Rus and Sunni Islam in the Bulgar State both became established in the 
10th century, serving as a key point of divergence between the two different cultures.  In addition 
to periodic invasions, infighting between disputed successors at the death of each Grand Prince 
severely weakened the Russian state.  Once the kingdom split into separate, autonomous 
principalities, the grand cities of Ancient Rus became markedly more vulnerable to foreign 
conquerors.12  
In the early 13th century, Genghis Khan united the conflicting clans of Central Asia and 
invaded the lands of the Volga Bulgars and Ancient Rus.  His successor Batu Khan continued the 
assault, decimating Ancient Rus with merciless physical destruction and hastening the fall of 
Kiev in 1240.13 Two waves of the Mongol-Tatar invasion over these few decades greatly 
expanded the Golden Horde Empire and ushered in the period popularly referred to by the Rus as 
the “Mongol Yoke”.  With control over such vast new terrain, Mongols from Central Asia 
migrated north over the next centuries to the modern day territories of Tatarstan and 
Bashkortostan, interspersing with the more native communities to become the “New Bulgars” of 
the region, ancestors of the present-day Tatars and Bashkirs.14  
Despite being subjugated to an alien power, the early Russians still openly engaged in 
their traditional cultural practices, securing religious and later political autonomy through the 
consistent payment of tribute.  The Great Khan passed a charter of immunity in 1267, which 
protected the Orthodox Church from taxes, military service, and seizure of property.  
Furthermore, the Mongol leader harshly decreed: “And anyone who would dare to blaspheme the 
Orthodox faith will be guilty of committing a crime and will be executed.”15 Such measured 
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leniency allowed the principality of Muscovy to gain strength economically and militarily and to 
develop a centralized, autocratic system to unify the Russian lands.  The Muscovite victory at the 
Battle of Kulikovo Pole in 1380 marked the decline of Mongol control, which subsequently 
disintegrated into multiple warring factions including the Khanate of Kazan where the “New 
Bulgars” established dominion.  In 1480 Ivan the Great (r. 1462-1505) finally dispelled Mongol 
influence from the Russian principalities.16 Though effectively avoiding cultural integration into 
the Golden Horde Empire, many efficient policies transferred over into the new Russian State 
such as the tax system, military draft, and international trade routes.17 
Consolidation of autocratic rule and massive territorial expansion marked the succeeding 
centuries.  In 1547 Ivan the Terrible (r. 1533-1584) was granted the title of Tsar, elevating his 
status as Grand Prince of Muscovy to supreme ruler of all the Russian lands.  His heirless son 
eventually hastened in the so-called Time of Troubles, a great power struggle between rival 
noble families out of which the Romanov dynasty ultimately prevailed to reign for the next three 
hundred years.  Amidst this strengthening of the political structure, Ivan the Terrible waged vast 
military campaigns, notably annexing the Khanate of Kazan, the present-day autonomous 
republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan.  Furthermore, he ordered the construction of the 
Cathedral of the Annunciation in Kazan to symbolize his authority over the Muslim populations, 
initiating a period of religious persecution and extensive destruction of Islamic civilization.18    
With the addition of larger swathes of land, the Muscovy solidified border security and 
increased economic development but also faced new challenges in ruling a multiethnic nation.  
Tsarist policies shifted back and forth between restricted political and religious toleration to 
forceful state and cultural homogenization of conquered peoples’ institutions and customs. The 
government initially integrated native aristocracies including Tatar nobility, who could provide 
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specialized knowledge on their regions of past rule.  In the 17th century, service records show 
only 1/3rd of officials identified as ethnically Russian with up to 17% claiming Tatar descent.19 
This suggests non-Russians still held some political sway in operations on the borders of the 
empire; however, their influence was soon diminished. 
During his reign Peter the Great (r. 1682-1725) introduced the Table of Ranks, requiring 
social standing by birth to be matched by exhibited competence.  Most future nobles studied in 
Western Europe to meet the requirements, downgrading the position of non-Russian officials 
who lacked access to such opportunities.20 Even those Tatar princes wealthy enough to secure 
such education still lost their land and serfs after the Christian faith became a prerequisite for 
ownership.  Historian David M. Griffiths aptly explains it was “Peter’s historic mission to return 
forcefully Russia to its pre-ordained European path, from which it had departed during the 
Mongol invasion.”21 With his strong intentions to “civilize” the border regions, Peter the Great 
instituted imperial decrees to convert non-Christian peoples such as the Tatars and Bashkirs to 
Orthodoxy.  Over 400,000 non-Russians were baptized and hundreds of mosques destroyed 
during the first half of the 18th century.22 State officials often offered material incentives for 
peaceful conversion, but pockets of resistance in multiethnic populations regularly appeared to 
challenge tsarist forces.    
Catherine the Great (r. 1762-1796) reversed many of these policies, instead utilizing 
religious toleration as a tool of state control.  Various ecclesiastical reforms fueled the 
development of Islamic institutions and widespread construction of mosques and madrassas.  In 
1789 the Ecclesiastical Assembly of the Muhammaden Creed was founded in Ufa to serve as a 
center for spiritual authority and political directives over the Muslim populations. The moderate 
Hanafi school of religious thought became the ideological foundation for most Islamic 
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institutions in the Russian Empire.  Doctrinal disputes often arose between officially licensed 
clerics and traditional theologians trained abroad.  Laypeople eventually used state structures to 
enforce Sharia law and even extolled the imperial family during Friday prayers in the mosque.23 
Ultimately, the autocratic regime became a patron of Sunni Islam to maintain the empire and 
further territorial expansion, winning the hearts and minds of local elites as a gateway to 
economic prosperity in Central Asia.   
In his analysis of Russia in the 19th century, historian Paul W. Werth argues tsarist 
policies shifted from tolerance of different cultures in exchange for general allegiance to a higher 
degree of cultural integration into one unitary national state.  Government officials, following the 
conventions established under Catherine the Great, granted special privileges to ethnic minorities 
acting as critical intermediaries for state-building in the border regions.  Tatars enjoyed access to 
higher education and formed a substantial merchant class while Bashkirs received tax and 
military exemptions and property rights until 1863.24 But religious policies under Tsar Alexander 
I (r. 1801-1825) and Tsar Nicholas I (r. 1825-1855) reestablished the predominance of 
Orthodoxy for the entire Russian empire, signaling a decline in social status for Muslim 
populations.  Fears also swirled regarding the more fanatical tenets of Sunni Islam as Imam 
Shamil ignited a decades-long resistance movement in the North Caucasus.  Such concerns 
prompted a revitalization of missionary work, doctrinal standardization of all tolerated faiths, and 
bans on the hajj, pilgrimage to Mecca, in order to limit the spread of more radical beliefs from 
foreign spiritual centers.25  
Amidst a wave of growing nationalist movements across Europe in the mid-19th century, 
Tsar Alexander II (r. 1855-1881) emancipated the serfs and offered new political and judicial 
liberties which propelled the government to identify even more closely with ethnic Russians of 
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Christian faith.  The reforms notably excluded changes in religious policy.  The waves of 
apostasy, particularly by baptized Tatars, and negative opinions of the Anti-Muslim Missionary 
Division meant state and church officials “increasingly came to regard Muslims in the region as 
intractably alien, unassimilable, and ultimately hostile to Christianity and the Russian State.”26 
Many non-Russians, still loyal to the tsar but frustrated with the church, submitted petitions for 
Muslim status and equal rights, uniting in a form of passive resistance against Russification.  
However, these requests fell on deaf ears as new forms of taxation, military conscription, and 
Russian language laws entered into power.27  
In this oppressive society of heavy police surveillance, the laypeople periodically 
triggered sudden revolts from fear of forced conversion and anger over imperial decrees of 
discrimination.  The widespread missionary education approach of Nikolai Il’minskii, who 
believed in Christian schooling through non-Russian languages, particularly threatened the 
cultural integrity of Islamic communities.  These attempts at proselytizing also contributed to the 
initial formation of national identities in the Volga-Ural region as Tatars and Bashkirs acquired 
more access to instruction in their native tongues.28 More radical sects such as the God’s 
Regiment of Muslim Old Believers incited conflict against local authorities; however, most 
Muslims did not resort to violence but continued to express their frustrations through the state 
system of Islamic institutions.29 Particularly, the Jadid reform movement emphasized the 
compatibility of Islam with modernist ideas such as nationalism, democracy, and rationality.  
Such increasing civic involvement resulted in some concessions for Muslim populations in the 
Revolution of 1905.  The political activism of ethnic minorities intensified as non-Russian 
leaders called for political, economic, and social reforms near the end of the Romanov dynasty. 
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During the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and subsequent Russian Civil War, communist 
revolutionary leaders Vladimir Lenin and Joseph Stalin determined that they needed to appease 
the non-Russian populations to quell their frustration with past tsarist tyranny and reassert 
control over the territories of the former Russian empire.  The birth of the republics of 
Bashkortostan and Tatarstan in 1919-1920 serves as a relevant case study.  The Bashkirs, who 
felt threatened by the growing Tatar influence in the Volga-Ural region, agreed to provide 
military support for the Bolshevik cause in exchange for an autonomous territory.  Having 
struggled and failed to assimilate the uncooperative Bashkirs into a unified Tatar Muslim entity, 
Tatar intellectuals expressed enough outrage over the arrangement to secure their own republic.  
The brief spell of Bolshevik-Bashkir collaboration failed miserably as prejudiced Red Army 
units atrociously persecuted Bashkir soldiers and Bashkir leaders ambitiously stretched the limits 
of improvised Soviet autonomy.30 Lenin and Stalin recentralized power over the local 
governments in the Volga-Ural region, needing to further formulate their nationalities policy.       
Following the social upheaval of the Soviet experiment in Bashkortostan, Lenin more 
thoroughly studied the mobilizing force of nationalism, envisioning his great Soviet Russia as “a 
future multinationalist socialist edifice.”31 His 1923 resolutions as premier granted limited 
autonomy to thousands of national territories including the lands of the Tatars and Bashkirs.  
Lenin believed this policy would “guide national movements beyond bourgeois primordial 
nationalism to Soviet international nationalism.”32 This process of nativization, institutionalizing 
ethnicity into the state apparatus, aimed to promote equality between all peoples under one 
harmonious socialist system; however, granting official identity to various ethnic groups also 
clashed with the push for assimilation into a common Soviet culture.33 His ideological hope, an 
irreconcilable paradox, was for a singular Soviet character to eventually transcend all the 
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nationalist peculiarities of the ethnic minorities.  Once given the opportunity to define 
themselves, the Tatars and Bashkirs like others began reviving their cultures, not seeking to 
integrate into the communist regime.  
Lenin’s successor, Joseph Stalin, revised the implementation of these nationality policies, 
declaring the greatest threat resides in the “nationalism that one has forgotten to combat.”34 He 
continued to glorify the image of the Soviet worker through socialist and atheistic propaganda 
but with more emphasis on the superiority of Russian nationality, deepening the contradictions 
ultimately detrimental to Communist control.35 Stalin initiated antireligious campaigns and 
violent industrialization in a push for social homogenization that terrorized the culture and 
livelihood of non-Russian peoples.  During his rule, tens of thousands of Muslim clerics, deemed 
“parasites of society,” lost their positions with the closure of over 24,000 mosques.36 The 
collectivization of agriculture, massive famines, and forcible migration left millions dead across 
the Soviet Union.37 Such catastrophic policies reignited the frustration in the hearts and minds of 
the non-Russian peoples, fueling solidarity in the community and a call for action.  By the 1960s, 
“most of the republics had become more national in character, not only demographically, but 
politically and culturally,”38 demonstrating persistence of the principles in Lenin’s nationality 
policy and consolidating effects of Stalin’s repressive regime. 
 Nationalist movements arose to challenge the Soviet regime through political activism in 
the 1970s and 1980s.  The grassroots practice of samizdat was a key form of dissident activity 
across the Soviet bloc in which individuals reproduced censored publications by hand and passed 
the documents from reader to reader.39 Many of these documents were appeals crafted by the 
Tatar and Bashkir peoples.  In the “Appeal to the 23rd Party Congress,” the authors scrutinized 
the policy of forced cultural homogenization, citing from 1944 to 1966 only 10 titles were 
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published in the Tatar language in comparison to 218 titles in the year 1940 alone.40 Such a trend 
explains why 70% of the non-Russian population in the region was illiterate in their own 
language.41 A petition to the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations highlighted the “unequal 
opportunities offered to members of different ethnic groups in the Tatar and Bashkir 
Autonomous Republics.”42 More details were provided in the “Appeal to Non-Russian 
Nationalities,” describing various examples of economic discrimination such as the price of meat 
rising by 250% in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan.43 Their demands gained little traction with 
General Secretary of the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev, pushing nationalists to find other 
alternatives.  
Ethnic nationalism, resulting from the paradoxical Soviet nationalities policy, a lack of 
viable economic opportunities, and status of inferiority for ethnic minorities, coincided with a 
call to arms in the form of Islamic militancy throughout Central Asia and Muslim-dominated 
republics of Russia.  By so explicitly assaulting religion, the “Soviets had reduced Islam to the 
legal status of a cult.”44 However, underground mosques and madrassas kept Islam alive 
clandestinely and provided forums for Muslim intellectuals.  As a consequence of the 
Communist attack on Islamic education, these scholars often traveled abroad as well, adopting 
revivalist beliefs of the more extremist Wahhabi-Salafi school that influenced the rise of Islamic 
militancy in the Soviet Union.45 The Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP), founded by a group of 
Tatar academicians, “sought to organize Muslims within the Soviet Union to campaign for the 
introduction of sharia (Islamic law) to Russia.”46 Hardliners of the IRP often cracked down on 
moderate reformists for hindering the push for rapid change.   
The Islamic group Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (HT) particularly antagonized more radical 
movements and the suspicious centralized government.  Founded in 1953, this once highly 
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secretive, pan-Islamic movement wields wide social influence in dozens of countries today, 
marketing their ideology through the effective use of media technology.  The organization 
“cleverly uses the history and message of early Islam as a revolutionary call to arms for the 
modern era.”47 However, HT does not believe in violently overthrowing the government but in 
actively and peacefully building mass support from the people to establish an Islamic state.  
Arrest records of suspected militants carrying related literature on this cause confirms the spread 
of HT throughout Central Asia and into the republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan.48 Muslim 
scholars in HT created a doctrine that served as adequate intellectual justifications for impatient 
youth to seek out rapid change in order to alleviate their perceived grievances.   
Significantly, Russian Muslims started interacting more with extremists abroad when the 
Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979.  From 1982 to 1992, over 35,000 Muslims 
radicalized from 43 Islamic countries to fight for the mujahedeen.49 Young Russian Muslim men 
studied and battled abroad, eventually returning with a more extremist interpretation of Islam 
from such countries as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.  The influx of radical militants, hardened 
veterans of the Soviet War in Afghanistan, created a variety of difficult internal security 
situations for Russia, especially in the Caucasus region. 
During the years leading up to the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Communist reformer 
Mikhail Gorbachev attempted to revive the nationality policy of Lenin, restoring lost rights to the 
Tatars and Bashkirs, but the empire was crumbling beneath his feet.  Prominent historian Ronald 
Grigor Suny insightfully concludes concerning ethnic nationalism during the Soviet Union: “a 
state that had set out to overcome nationalism and the difference between nations had in fact 
created a set of institutions and initiated processes that fostered the development of conscious, 
secular, politically mobilizable nationalities.”50 Islam was used as a “unifying cultural symbol”51 
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and also politicized to foment religious extremism, revealing the overlap and distinction between 
ethnic nationalism and Islamic radicalization.  
The Tatars and Bashkirs represent two of the most influential of these Muslim 
nationalities; thus, their demands became reality in the formation of the Russian Federation.  The 
first president of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, even proclaimed to the republics of the crumbling Soviet 
Union, “take as much sovereignty as you can swallow.”52 The Treaty of 1994 ensures the 
republics deemed autonomous including Tatarstan and Bashkortostan have the rights to craft 
their own constitution, institute their own state languages, and establish economic ties with 
foreign nations.53 Amidst the chaos of the failing Soviet Union, the leaders of Tatarstan and 
Bashkortostan seized a key opportunity for political power.  They rejected secession in order to 
utilize the Russian superstructure while being essentially independent and keeping 100% of local 
revenues.54 Notably, other ethnic minorities were not allotted similar latitude. 
Though President Yeltsin only offered various levels of limited sovereignty, the republic 
of Chechnya demanded the right of self-determination and called for independence.  The ensuing 
conflict prompted the First Chechen War (1994-1996) with international sources citing casualty 
numbers of more than 80,000 civilians and soldiers.55 Amidst a shaky truce, the interwar period 
saw a different instigator than the nationalism that fueled the first hostilities.  Visiting al Qaeda 
leaders introduced a different kind of fundamentalist Islam that called for violent jihad in order 
to establish a country based on Sharia law.56 The upsurge in extremist activity and the lack of 
governmental control in the region ultimately triggered the Second Chechen War (1999-2009).  
The Russian government specifically cited the 1999 Moscow apartment bombings that killed 
over 300 people as justification for their invasions into Dagestan and Chechnya.57 An extensive 
counterinsurgency campaign culminated in more Russian security personnel killed than US 
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forces in Iraq and Afghanistan during 2008 and 2009.58 In addition to various successful and 
attempted terrorist attacks across Russia such as the 2011 Domodedovo International Airport 
bombing, violent hostilities and human rights abuses continue to plague the republics of the 
North Caucasus.  The important political, economic, and social trends presented in this historical 
analysis inform the situation in the modern day. 
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CHAPTER 3: CONTEMPORARY LITERATURE REVIEW 
Presently, the regions of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan are not heavily studied in most 
academic circles, but there is an increasing amount of relevant research to be reviewed.  General 
population and limited economic data is easily accessible on the area.  According to the 2010 
census, an estimated 3,786,400 people live in Tatarstan.  Tatars and Russians represent about 
53.2% and 39.7% of the population respectively.  Out of 173 ethnic groups in the republic, 8 
ethnic groups including the Bashkirs have over 10,000 members.  Large communities of Tatars 
reside across Russia, particularly in Bashkortostan, and Central Asia as well.  Oil ranks as the 
primary industry in Tatarstan with estimated reserves of 1 billion tons.59 Comparatively, 
according to the same 2010 census, an estimated 4,065,993 people live in Bashkortostan.  About 
a third of the population are Bashkirs of over 100 nationalities residing in the republic.  
Bashkortostan leads the region in chemical processing with plants stationed across the territory.60  
 In his article “Russia and Tatarstan: At a Crossroads of History”61 published in 2000, 
Raphael Khakimov, Director of the Institute of History at the Academy of Sciences of Tatarstan, 
provides a detailed analysis of the morphing relationship between the autonomous republic of 
Tatarstan and the Russian Federation a decade after the fall of the Soviet Union.  He begins with 
the brief mentioning of a key visit by Mintimer Shaimiev, President of Tatarstan, at a Harvard 
forum in 1994.  From this academic environment, the term “the Tatarstan model” was born and 
gained international recognition.  Tatarstan embodies “an attempt to find peaceful ways of 
development in such a supermilitarized country” even with the longstanding historical dispute 
between Kazan and Moscow.  Furthermore, Khakimov claims, “social tension is clearly 
weakening in the republic from year to year.” This assessment usefully relates to the current 
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situation in examining the possible growth of social tension from perceived political and 
religious grievances of the Tatars and Bashkirs. 
 Khakimov addresses the underlying identity issue that may be developing in Tatarstan 
and Bashkortostan today more rapidly in the form of activism and violence when he posits, “if 
the indigenous people of Rossiia often appear more ancient than the Russians, then from whom 
exactly should one begin a description of the history of Rossiia?”  The answer to this question 
remains unclear, serving as one point of justification for the demands of ethnic minorities in 
Russia.  During this post-Soviet period, “Islamic and Turkic influence on Tatarstan and other 
republics has intensified” while the Russians called for a renaissance of their own culture.  Such 
nationalist movements represent the traditional social processes of two different civilizations: 
Orthodoxy and Islam.  Despite the dissimilarities, Khakimov tends to use a cautiously optimistic 
tone in discussing political cooperation between Kazan and Moscow.  Furthermore, he cites the 
importance of Islamic reformism in recent history, which “permits traditional Tatar and Islamic 
values to be organically united with the ideas of liberalism and democracy.”  Ultimately, this 
opinion piece presents the different models of development progressing in Russia and Tatarstan, 
acting as an important landmark for comparison with later events. 
 As revealed in another work titled “Opportunities and Limits of Self-Creation and 
Identity Politics: Tatarstan’s Paradiplomatic Project”62 by Gulnaz Sharafutdinova, the 
aforementioned article author, Raphael Khakimov, served in an additional role as a state advisor 
to the President.  It is important to note his position in considering the likely politicization of his 
ideas.  Sharafutdinova uses Tatarstan as a case study to examine “paradiplomacy” in Russia, 
defined as “international activities of governments on the sub national level.”63 Through the 
scope of the constructivist approach, which “perceives identities as a result of “construction” that 
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is usually done by the elites, both political and cultural,”64 her findings coincide with the models 
of development cited by Khakimov.   
Just as President Shaimiev’s visit to the Harvard forum received international 
recognition, Tatarstan further sought to construct a sovereign state identity in the global 
community through relations with foreign nations.  The government of Tatarstan signed 14 
agreements with sovereign states and developed connections with the United Nations and League 
of Arab States.  Though often economic and cultural on the surface, agreements of friendship and 
cooperation with republics such as Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Abkhazia harbored underlying 
political ramifications challenging Russian policy in the region.  In a more overt challenge to 
federal authority, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Ingushetia all publicly criticized the Russian 
course of action in the Kosovo crisis of 1999, forbidding their military units from serving in the 
area.65 These diplomatic moves suggest autonomous republics in Russia enjoyed a period of 
great political flexibility during the last decade of the 20th century.   
Tatar leaders also established close economic ties in Western nations and Muslim-Turkic 
countries.  Partnerships with the United States and France revolved around the competitive 
industries of oil and petrochemical products, leading to the creation of diplomatic trade missions 
on both sides.  Relationships with the Middle East spanned deeper.  Linked by culture and 
religion, the governments of Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan treated the President of Tatarstan as head 
of a sovereign state during official visits.  Items produced domestically in Tatarstan such as 
trucks, helicopters, and defense related equipment also became economically viable, proving to 
be quite competitive in Middle Eastern markets.66 Despite actively projecting the image of a 
sovereign state throughout the international community, Tatar officials lost the political mobility 
for such maneuvers with the arrival of President Vladimir Putin. 
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On entering office in 2000, Putin divided Russia into seven federal districts and 
dispatched presidential envoys with the full weight of the law to lead a standardization 
campaign.  This project of recentralization aimed to harmonize the violations of the power-
sharing treaties negotiated by Yeltsin in the 1990s with federal law.  In his article “Resisting 
Putin’s Federal Reforms on the Legal Front,”67 Robert Sharlet cites Tatarstan and Bashkortostan 
as the “two most consistent resisters of Russian authority.”68 He argues, “revising local laws did 
not usually arouse ethnic national passions or regional chauvinism”69 because newly installed 
democratic processes in the republican districts allowed all interested parties to participate in the 
revision process.  However, reconciling the republics’ constitutions with federal standards 
proved much more difficult since the “growth of nationalism and separatism in the 
republics…inevitably found its expression in legislation [and], most of all the republics’ 
constitutions.”70 At the time of the publication of this article in 2003, Sharlet claims Tatarstan 
and Bashkortostan successfully resisted Putin’s push for recentralization with only minor 
concessions on the legal front.  Clever political strategizing such as exploiting Russian concerns 
with religious fundamentalism helped in these efforts. 
Having published a few years later, Sharafutdinova reaches a different conclusion on the 
successes of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan amidst increasing authoritarian governance.  She 
attests that new federal laws on the tax system, political parties, and local legislatures ensure 
federal control in the regions and limit the symbolic nature of paradiplomacy for the republics.  
Sharafutdinova argues a domestic political regime defines what a region is during times of 
stability, while periods of chaos allow more influence from foreign external pressures.  Thus, as 
a result of Putin’s policies, “sub-national involvement in international policy-making does not 
pose a threat of disintegration for Russia.”71 Secession appears unlikely since the loss of regional 
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authority hurts the perception of legitimate sovereignty for Tatarstan and Bashkortostan on the 
world stage.  
In his article “Revisiting Sovereign Tatarstan,”72 Matthew Derrick also agrees that Putin 
has dismantled the autonomy of Tatarstan and other regions, claiming Tatar leaders promoted 
“the institutions, practice, and discourses that are designed to legitimate a particular conception 
of a state,”73 but lost political ground to increasing federal authority.  In contrast to 
Sharafutdinova, he places his assessment in the context of Moscow’s recognition of Abkhazia’s 
and South Ossetia’s sovereign statehood in 2008, implying the potential for a similar movement 
in Tatarstan.  Derrick includes a quote from a Kazan-based opposition newspaper supporting this 
suggestion: “For the first time Russia has recognized former autonomous republics as 
independent.  Tatar society has been moved to action.  A certain psychological barrier has been 
overcome.”74 In the wake of the blitz for sovereignty during the 1990s, Putin systematically 
stripped the paradiplomatic projects and territorial autonomy of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan in 
his push for centralization, creating an environment for potential dissension.  This research 
partially aims to examine whether nationalist fervor is increasing as Putin continues to pass 
policies limiting the political freedoms of ethnic minorities in these republics. 
Tracking the trend of Islamic radicalization in conjunction with or as an alternative to 
ethnic nationalism represents another topic of interest for this research.  In his 2007 paper “The 
Potential of Radical Islam in Tatarstan,”75 Eduard Ponarin gives an insightful glimpse into the 
“frail balance between local religious and nationalist activists, the local government, and the 
federal center.”76 He provides a strikingly different analysis of the post-Soviet period in claiming 
that Tatarstan was one of the least democratic republics in Russia by the end of the 20th century.  
He cites the authoritarian policies of President Shaimiev who forcefully established one religious 
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authority in Tatarstan, promoted closer relations with Moscow on domestic security operations, 
and limited Muslim opposition leaders in local elections.  Consequently, rival religious 
organizations exiled from Tatarstan still exist in Bashkortostan today, fueling tensions with state-
backed spiritual leaders across the Volga-Ural region.77 
Ponarin draws his conclusions from interviews with imams and Islamic students in 
Tatarstan and Bashkortostan.  Their opinions reveal the effects of the religious schism that 
occurred in the 1990s.  The majority thinks negatively on the politicization of Islam but believes 
Muslim authorities should be politically involved at least locally.  Younger individuals even 
explained that Islam and politics operate side by side.  Notably, some commented that poorer 
mosques receive financial support from Saudi Arabia, which often leads to the spread of 
Wahhabi-Salafi tenets, a more conservative and frequently radical interpretation of Islam. 
Following a 2003 gas pipeline explosion, allegedly caused by students from a madrassa in 
Bashkortostan, leaders in Tatarstan worked with Moscow more willingly to crack down on 
Islamic extremists, often resulting in indiscriminate arrests.78 Ponarin argues a combination of 
these issues suggests “a union of radicalized nationalists in opposition and religious opposition is 
an emerging reality.”79 Such collaboration is an important trend to examine in the present 
situation. 
In their latest “Islam, Islamism and Politics in Eurasia Report,”80 the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies (CSIS) assesses that “domestic political factors and the influence of 
and infiltration by the global jihadi and Salafist revolutionary movements”81 are fueling the 
spread of jihadi terrorism to Tatarstan.  CSIS cites the Kazan terrorist attacks in July as a primary 
example of this development.  Allegedly, the government of Tatarstan originally selected Mufti 
Faizov to weed out mullahs sympathetic to radical Islam, which explains the assassination 
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attempt on his life.  Another potential terrorist attack was thwarted by human error when four 
suspected radical Islamists were killed when an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) exploded in 
their car on August 20th.  More alarmingly, CSIS reports the first cases of cooperation between 
Tatarstan radicalists and Caucasus jihadists.  During their video claiming responsibility for the 
aforementioned incident, the Mujahedeen of Tatarstan pledged their loyalty to the head of the 
Caucasus Emirate.  Rebel leaders in the Caucasus region had been calling to set up Volga and 
Ural fronts for jihad as early as 2004.  Similar messages of encouragement appeared from al-
Qaeda through Bulgar Jamaat, a terrorist group of ethnic Tatars who fled to Pakistan, calling for 
jihad against Russia.  CSIS certainly gives an in depth look at specific cases suggesting the 
increase of political violence across the Volga-Ural region. 
The February 2013 report “Islamist Militant Threats to Eurasia”82 presented by Jacob 
Zenn of the Jamestown Foundation to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs proactively 
addresses such national security issues.  Resulting from the invasion of Afghanistan, Zenn 
explains Central Asian Islamist militants now “harbor a hatred of the United States after fighting 
against the United States since 2001.”83 Particularly, a group called Jund al-Khilafa, formed by 
three Kazakhs in 2011, have launched attacks throughout Central Asia and dispatched cells to the 
North Caucasus.  Though banned in Russia in 2003, Hizb ut Tahrir (HuT) has reemerged with an 
estimated 20,000 to 100,000 members.  Zenn emphasizes “many Islamists first join Salafist 
groups like HuT before moving onto Salafist-Jihadist militant groups.”84 Most significantly is the 
following note included in the report: 
Although it is beyond the scope of the discussion today, it is important to mention that 
the Caucasus Emirate is seeking to expand its financial and operational networks from 
the North Caucasus to the Russian Volga and Ural regions and Tatarstan and 
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Bashkortostan.  There has been a steady rise of Salafism in those regions in recent years 
with many HuT cells broken up.  New militant groups also have formed which target 
imams who do not support a strict interpretation of Sharia Law.85 
As depicted here, the republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan appear to be receiving more 
attention domestically from security professionals and political leaders in recent years.  Such 
interest provides further impetus for pursuing this research. 
 Since the fall of the Soviet Union, few scholars have studied political violence and 
territorial autonomy in the Volga-Ural region of the Russian Federation.  Many of the 
aforementioned authors present opinions that seemingly contradict each other when reviewed 
side by side.  However, the complexity of these topics demands such intellectual conflict.  
Despite the wide range of claims, certain constants connect the various arguments.  The 
continually morphing relationships between local religious institutions, regional governments, 
and the federal center often impact the growth of Islamic radicalization and ethnic nationalism in 
Tatarstan and Bashkortostan.  These shifts frequently coincide with the push for stronger 
autonomy, identity formation, and periodic armed resistance.  Specific case studies also 
emphasize the expanding ties between religious extremists and ethnic nationalists in the Volga-
Ural region and potential threats to Russian internal security from transnational terrorist groups. 
Informed by this contemporary literature review, the proceeding chapters further explore the 
current trends of Islamic radicalization and ethnic nationalism in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan as 
well as the government reaction to these developments. 
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CHAPTER 4: PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY 
In order to most objectively assess these trends in the present, I have selected a less 
common but certainly rigorous method of qualitative research known as Constant Comparative 
Content Analysis.  Sociologist Barney G. Glaser outlines his concerns with Qualitative Data 
Analysis (QDA) and offers useful modifications to Grounded Theory (GT), the category in 
which this methodology falls, in his article “Remodeling Grounded Theory.”86 Glaser defines GT 
as “a set of integrated conceptual hypotheses systematically generated to produce an inductive 
theory about a substantive area.”  He overly criticizes QDA, burdened with the need for 
achieving accuracy, believing it better to “begin with no preconceived theory and then generate 
one during the analysis.”  I have modified this model at my discretion to best serve my purposes 
in this research, cutting the more draconian directives in GT; however, I still readily apply the 
fundamental tenets of this theory such as to “maintain analytical distance” and “develop 
theoretical insight.”  These techniques help ensure a more objective approach to the topics of 
interest. 
Constant Comparative Content Analysis begins with a form of regular daily data 
collecting so that “all data are constantly compared to generate concepts.”  Unintentionally at 
first as a result of simple curiosity, I compiled a set of useful data by following English and 
Russian language articles both closely and remotely related to the Kazan terrorist attacks in July 
2012.  Notably, Glaser explains the “criteria for establishing the core variable within a GT are 
that it is central, relating to as many other categories and their properties as possible and 
accounting for a large portion of the variation in a pattern of behavior.”  The Kazan terrorist 
attacks embody the core variable for this research.  The key concepts associated with this act of 
political violence are the trends of ethnic nationalism, Islamic radicalization, and government 
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reaction to a potential increase in extremism.  With an established initial theoretical package, the 
next component of GT is developing core categories that connect to the core variable. 
This honors thesis addresses four core categories relevant to the autonomous republics of 
Tatarstan and Bashkortostan: federal security operations, influence of religious institutions, 
pursuit for regional autonomy, and identity formation.  I review various original Russian media 
sources in order to compare and contrast the key concepts across these core categories.  The 
conclusions drawn from each core category inform the diverse impact of the core variable on the 
target areas.  Thus, the various effects of the Kazan terrorist attacks serve as an effective testing 
ground to explore the current dynamics of Islamic radicalization and ethnic nationalism in 
Tatarstan and Bashkortostan as well as the government reaction to these developments.  
Naturally, in conducting detailed news source analysis, bias represents a potential confounding 
factor.  The following discussion briefly addresses the extent of current government interference 
and news sensationalism in the Russian media and how this study intends to evaluate such bias in 
order to derive more thorough conclusions on the topics of interest. 
FIGURE 1: DIAGRAM OF METHODOLOGY 
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After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russian media outlets enjoyed a brief period of press 
freedom markedly different from the past decades of strict government censorship.  Notable 
broadcasting and print companies such as NTV and Nezavisimaya Gazeta launched in the 1990s, 
leading the way for post-communist media independence and Western liberalism.  But the rushed 
introduction of capitalism to the market and shaky political structure of the federation resulted in 
rampant corruption, economic decline, and a disastrous war in Chechnya.  By the turn of the 
millennium, the Russian people readily approved of President Vladimir Putin whose 
authoritarian policies provided the appearance of stability; however, his arrival ended the earlier 
movement for an open and free civil society.  To recentralize political and economic control, 
President Putin challenged the business oligarchs who secured the majority of their assets during 
the privatization of Russia.  The federal government seized their holdings, many of which 
included media outlets, and either integrated these companies into their own apparatus as in the 
Gazprom takeover of NTV or transferred ownership to loyal managers.  Such legal action 
reinstituted widespread government interference in the Russian media. 
In her article “Media Manipulation and Political Control in Russia,”87 Maria Lipman 
categorizes the government-controlled media sources influential on the Russian populace today: 
The first is the largest mass-audience media, especially national TV channels, which 
reach almost 100 per cent of Russian households. The three major national channels are 
used as tools of state propaganda in a way that is increasingly reminiscent of the Soviet 
days. The second category includes a variety of smaller-audience outlets – print, radio, 
websites and smaller TV stations. This category is of less interest for the ruling elite as a 
political resource, but all the Russian media operate on the understanding that loyalty to 
the state is the order of the day.88 
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Significantly, television functions as the primary medium of political manipulation while other 
modes of communication also present opinions loyal to the government.  Lipman elaborates on 
the state strategy for control of the press, citing a 2008 Russian Newsweek article that exposed 
weekly high-level meetings between Kremlin officials and top TV directors to craft the news 
agenda for each week.  Despite these preconceived headlines, Russia tolerates some opposition 
news outlets to appease the intelligentsia and to manufacture a more favorable image for the 
international community.  Such leniency has shown to be limited in cases when media-driven 
investigations particularly threaten the government.  Though speculation abounds, most suspect 
the state sponsored the assassinations of Novaya Gazeta journalists, Anna Politkovskaya and 
Yury Shchekochikhin.  These incidents fuel the phenomenon of self-censorship in the Russian 
media.89 
 Though journalists, fearful of retribution, often censor their articles, an unexpected 
newsworthy event may create difficulties for developing opinions in line with the government.  
In his study “Quantifying Polarisation in Media Coverage,”90 Rolf Fredheim demonstrates how 
the unanticipated 2011-12 protests over the presidential elections polarized the mainstream 
media in Russia.  He tracks pronoun usage in various Russian newspapers to measure the 
emotional engagement and persuasive nature of the more radical language in each article on the 
protests.  His results show during which months the government strongly intervened to 
incorporate stronger anti-opposition rhetoric into the news.  Such research gives a clear example 
of how the federal government may blatantly interfere in the Russian print media today as a 
consequence of a largely unforeseen and politically threatening situation. 
 Amidst the government-manipulated bias in the Russian media, news outlets also have a 
natural tendency to sensationalize the facts, dangerously morphing public opinion on certain 
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issues.  In his series “Window on Eurasia,”91 Paul Goble, a senior analyst at the Jamestown 
Foundation, cites a recent interview conducted by Islam News92 with the Russian Institute for 
Strategic Studies (RISI), which is “a frequent source of anti-Muslim commentaries in the 
Russian media.”  RISI scholar Azhdar Kurtov claims that journalists sensationalize the threat of 
Islam to attract more readers, consequently “creating the very sensations that they have 
incorrectly reported.”  Though their policies impact the headlines, he argues the government 
generally does not direct anti-Muslim rhetoric in the news.  But Goble assesses that since the 
state-influenced RISI also regularly promotes hysteria in the media, Kurtov’s comments may aim 
to “deflect responsibility” from the government onto journalists for the negative press against 
Islam.  These opposing viewpoints show how news sensationalism and government interference 
play an interconnected role in biasing the Russian media.               
With the preceding comments in mind, I decided to review both Russian broadcasting 
and print news sources because they are the two most popular and most politically manipulated 
mediums in recent years.  After appraising dozens of news reports in various media outlets 
through weekly data collection and online archival research, I chose 16 news articles and 
television broadcasts to be analyzed in the following two chapters.  Preceding the analysis of 
each news article, I briefly discuss the ownership history and paper circulation to present the 
specific bias and societal influence of that print media source.  The television broadcasts come 
from two of the three most viewed and state-controlled national channels.  Sharing this context 
further clarifies the deductions drawn from each news outlet.    
Variety of opinion and clearest relevance to the core categories informed the final 
selection of the media sources.  During the stage of media source collection, I discovered certain 
core categories more readily reflect the dynamics of specific key concepts, prompting the 
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subsequent organization of analysis.  The first research chapter examines the key concept of 
Islamic radicalization through the core categories of federal security operations and influence of 
religious institutions.  The second research chapter focuses on ethnic nationalism through the 
scope of pursuit for regional autonomy and identity formation.   Inferences on the government 
reaction to a potential rise in extremism permeate both discussions.  
Ultimately, since the media often serves as a powerful tool for mobilizing the masses, 
comparing the conflicting presentations of frequently sensationalized facts in the news proves 
useful to correctly interpreting the effects of the Kazan terrorist attacks.  Furthermore, state 
interference in the media provides particular insights into the government stance on the situation 
and the subsequent impact of that bias on the populace.  Through Constant Comparative Content 
Analysis of news sources, I intend to uncover accurate information on the trends of Islamic 
radicalization and ethnic nationalism in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan as well as the government 
reaction to these developments. 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
35 
CHAPTER 5: STRONG FEDERAL GOVERNMENT REACTION  
TO THREAT OF RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM 
The psychological process of Islamic radicalization involves a “change in beliefs, 
feelings, and behaviors in directions that increasingly justify intergroup violence and demand 
sacrifice in defense of the ingroup.”93 This foundational definition serves as the litmus test for 
assessing the trend of Islamic radicalization in the Volga-Ural region.  In the wake of the Kazan 
terrorist attacks, the Russian federal government reacted strongly to the seemingly increasing 
threat of religious extremism.  Through Constant Comparative Content Analysis, the following 
compilation of media sources demonstrates the impact of two core categories, federal security 
operations and religious institutions, on the possible spread of radical Islam in the republics of 
Tatarstan and Bashkortostan.  Ultimately, outside of a few isolated incidents, the religious 
communities of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan appear relatively stable, not increasingly 
radicalizing to commit political violence against local spiritual leaders and the state.  But the ever 
more forceful government response to secure the 2014 Sochi Olympics and resurging Islamic 
terrorism following the NATO withdrawal from Central Asia threaten to alienate more Muslim 
individuals in the Volga-Ural region.     
In the few weeks following the Kazan terrorist attacks, the state-controlled Russian 
language news channel NTV broadcasted several speculative reports on the suspected 
perpetrators of the car bombing and fatal shooting.  A broadcast headlined “Mufti of Tatarstan 
Crossed Path of Hajj-Operator”94 on 20 July 2012 describes the arrest of five suspects with 
business connections to a company called Idel-Hajj, which organizes the hajj, pilgrimage to 
Mecca, for the local Muslim community.  The report initially identifies the conflict with radical 
Islam and battle for control of the hajj as the primary motivators for the incident.  The next 
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several comments detail how Mufti Ildus Faizov, who survived the assassination attempt, 
instituted a quota on the number of Muslims permitted to travel to Mecca in order to control the 
Islamic radicalization of groups abroad.  Such restrictions as well as a rise in the price of the hajj 
displeased many community members.  The report even considerately mentions how most 
Muslims save money their whole life to participate in the pilgrimage.  By critically reviewing 
recent religious policy changes, the government-influenced broadcast seems to almost justify the 
terrorist activity, depicting the incident as an isolated act of excused intra-communal violence 
and not as the harbinger of radical Islam to Tatarstan.  Ironically, the federal center likely 
compelled Mufti Faizov to institute these modifications in the first place but still wants to uphold 
the image of good working relations with Muslim populations after the Kazan terrorist attacks.    
Another NTV news clip headlined “Mujahedeen of Tatarstan Admitted Attacks on 
Mufti”95 on 8 August 2012 analyzes two videos in which a previously unheard of radical Islamic 
organization called the Mujahedeen of Tatarstan claims responsibility for the assassinations in 
July.  The report provides various details on the dress and arms of the militants as well as quotes 
of more radical rhetoric from the group such as “I think that the operation was successful, and we 
will carry out further acts against the enemies of Allah.”  Notably, a discussion on the allegiance 
of the Mujahedeen of Tatarstan to North Caucasus militant leader Doku Umarov of the Caucasus 
Emirate also unfolds in the broadcast.  This new development undermines the conjecture of the 
previous report, suggesting a larger problem with Islamic radicalization stemming from the 
North Caucasus exists in the Volga-Ural region.  Assuming state interference in NTV, the shift in 
bias shows how the Russian government initially preferred to depict the incident as a singular 
intra-communal financial issue; however, the involvement of the Mujahedeen of Tatarstan 
necessitated wider recognition of the potentially growing threat of Muslim extremism.         
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The English language regional newspaper The Kazan Herald provides a more balanced 
view of the July incident.  The Kazan Herald is Tatarstan’s first and only English language 
newspaper founded in May 2010 and is owned by the independent The Kazan Herald Publishing 
Company.  It distributes a monthly print version free-of-charge around Kazan and other cities 
and regularly updates a website.96 The opinions expressed in The Kazan Herald likely appear 
more nuanced and objective than the Russian national newspapers and television channels. 
On 24 August 2012, Mark Galeotti, a professor at New York University, published an 
article titled “The Jihad is Not on the March,”97 sharing a healthy skepticism of the supposed link 
between the Mujahedeen of Tatarstan and the Caucasus Emirate, a militant network banned in 
Russia and on the U.S. List of Most Wanted Terrorist Organizations.  He mentions alternative 
explanations exist for the targeted assassinations of the Mufti and his deputy.  As reported by 
NTV, another driving factor is the change for the hajj to a different tour provider under the 
control of the Tatarstan Spiritual Board of Muslims.  Galeotti further suggests the Mujahedeen of 
Tatarstan claimed responsibility for the attacks conspicuously late.  Though not verified by a 
documented source, he attests that only 3,000 Tatars follow the extreme Salafist form of Islam 
with only a small minority endorsing terrorism.   
This article primarily addresses the attempts of the Mujahedeen of Tatarstan and 
Caucasus Emirate to bolster their combined identity as an imagined community, waging jihad 
against Russia in a coordinated fashion.  Unlike the second NTV report, Galeotti undermines 
such a claim in describing the insurgencies of the North Caucasus to be “a constellation of 
largely autonomous local and republican groups” who engage in “opportunistic and small-scale” 
attacks.  Furthermore, he emphasizes the Russian government has “shown a tendency to over-
react when it feels its authority and power are in question.”  The local interior minister even 
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claimed they have been fighting “an undeclared war” in the region for the last thirteen years.  
These “recruiting sergeants for the jihad” instigate the harsh crackdowns of the Russian 
government that give recognition to the constructed reality of an interconnected radical Salafist 
community in Russia.  This tendency for overreaction may unintentionally contribute to the 
growth of Islamic radicalization as extremist leaders effectively exploit the brutality of the 
government to further justify violent jihad against the state. 
The Russian language national newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta presents additional 
evidence of policies against religious fundamentalism similarly described in The Kazan Herald 
article and NTV report.  With a small circulation of 40,000 papers out of Moscow, the 
publication mainly targets politicians, businessmen, and academics.  It was founded in 1990 and 
expanded under the ownership of exiled oligarch, Boris Berezovsky.  In August 2005, 
Konstantin Remchukov, a former Russian government advisor, purchased the paper then 
appointed himself editor-in-chief in February 2007.  Nezavisimaya Gazeta maintains a reputation 
as prominent and prestigious in the Russian media and offers a forum for opinions more critical 
of the Russian government.98 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta published an article titled “Mufti of Tatarstan Laid Out 
Credentials”99 on 3 March 2013 announcing the new Mufti of Tatarstan.  The second half of the 
text focuses on the past leadership of Mufti Faizov before the Kazan terrorist attacks.  Mufti 
Faizov became head of the Muslim community in Tatarstan in April 2011.  He immediately 
initiated an “unprecedented campaign of purification” to rid the religious establishment of radical 
Islam.  All Tatar imams needed to attend training courses condemning extremist ideas and 
emphasizing the traditional Hanafi school, a long-standing theory of religious thought in the 
Volga-Ural region.  Those who refused to attend were denied official licenses to oversee 
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mosques in Tatarstan.  That such activity was “unprecedented” suggests these policy shifts may 
have frustrated not only extremist sects but even moderate groups with different doctrinal 
interpretations.  As mentioned in the earlier news sources, restrictions to the hajj also alienated 
many Muslim community members.   
Islamic institutions likely faced more pressure from the federal center to standardize 
doctrinal principles across Tatarstan and weed out religious extremism as the 2014 Sochi 
Olympics drew closer.  These changes created perceived grievances specific to the Tatar 
populace to justify the Kazan terrorist attacks in July 2012, which challenges the notion that the 
call for armed resistance originated from the global jihad orientation of the Caucasus Emirate.  
Though a shocking act of political violence, the July incident does not necessarily represent an 
increasing trend of Islamic radicalization in the Volga-Ural region but was perhaps an isolated 
intra-communal strike by an opportunistic fringe group.  However, many Muslim community 
members still opposed the state-influenced policies of Mufti Faizov, indicating the sentiment for 
more radical behavior may exist in the religious community of Tatarstan. 
The English language daily newspaper The Moscow Times thickens the plot surrounding 
the Kazan terrorist attacks presented in the previous media outlets.  Started in 1992 for foreigners 
working in Russia, the publication now attracts Russian readers as well, delivering to 500 
locations around Moscow and actively updating a detailed website with an archive of over 
130,000 articles.  The Moscow Times upholds a standard of precise, reliable, and independent 
information and provides a platform for more liberal views against the Russian government.100 
On 26 October 2012, The Moscow Times published an article titled “Slain Kazan 
Gunmen Planned Terror Attack,”101 which identifies the possible culprits of the Kazan terrorist 
attacks.  The report provides a gripping account of a federal security operation against two 
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additional suspects in the July incident, Robert Valeyev and Ruslan Kashapov, who intended to 
carry out a terrorist attack on an upcoming Muslim holiday.  The authorities killed the gunmen 
following a firefight that lasted several hours and a dangerous raid during which an officer 
sacrificed himself when one of the militants attempted to ignite an explosive device.  Weapons, 
ammunition, a bomb-making laboratory, and 3 kilograms of explosives were recovered at the 
scene of the confrontation. 
Unidentified law enforcement officials claim “the gunmen were part of an Islamic 
terrorist organization with links to the Taliban and that they had trained in camps on the 
Afghanistan-Pakistan border.”  Another cited source in the article identifies the “Islamic terrorist 
organization” as Bulgar-Uyghur Jamaat, a militant group in North Waziristan established in 2006 
by Pavel Dorokhov, a native of Bashkortostan, for Volga-Ural Muslims to wage jihad against 
Russia.  The article conspicuously leaves out any reference to the Mujahedeen of Tatarstan and 
their connection to the Caucasus Emirate.  Emphasizing the involvement of the Taliban creates 
the rather sensationalized impression of a growing foreign extremist influence on Muslim 
individuals in Russia.  
Drawing from NTV, The Kazan Herald, and The Moscow Times, the Mujahedeen of 
Tatarstan, Caucasus Emirate, Bulgar-Uyghur Jamaat, and the Taliban all loosely interconnect in 
claiming responsibility for the Kazan terrorist attacks.  This vast array of non-state transnational 
actors, proponents of the al-Qaeda brand, potentially involved in the incident seems to suggest an 
increasing trend of Islamic radicalization throughout southwestern Russia.  Furthermore, with the 
impending NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Bulgar-Uyghur Jamaat may gain more 
latitude to strengthen operations in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan.  Such a conclusion markedly 
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contrasts the more conservative assessment of the Kazan terrorist attacks as an isolated act of 
intra-communal conflict stemming from changes in hajj operations. 
A few months after the October incident presented in The Moscow Times, the state-
controlled Russian language news channel Perviy Kanal reported more extensive federal security 
operations against Muslims, indicating government apprehension over the perceived growth of 
religious extremism following the Kazan terrorist attacks.  A broadcast headlined “Large-Scale 
Security Operation Held in St. Peterburg”102 on 9 February 2013 states authorities arrested 271 
individuals for inciting hatred and terrorism.  The news clip firmly characterizes these hundreds 
of people as all “followers of radical Islam” and subjectively suggests that “it is appropriate to 
name [them] fanatics” according to information provided on the raids.  Investigators cited in the 
report speculate that foreign sponsors provided funds and literature to the extremist faction, 
insinuating the growing influence of radical groups from abroad.   The discovery of 20 people 
without official documents also corroborates this claim.  In the last few comments, the broadcast 
emphasizes the unprecedented scale of the federal security operation for battling radical Islam.   
Through periodic arrests of large groups of Muslims, the federal government likely 
strives to create the appearance of soundly handling the problem of religious extremism 
throughout Russia.  However, such security operations may alienate Muslim populations in the 
Volga-Ural region who identify with other ethnic minorities through Islam and condemn the 
indiscriminate detentions of potentially innocent individuals.  Other media sources estimate no 
less than 700 arrests occurred during the February operation.103 Returning to The Kazan Herald 
article, government overreaction threatens to bolster the trend of Islamic radicalization in Russia. 
As presented in The Moscow Times and Perviy Kanal, the Russian language national 
newspaper Kommersant further depicts the forceful government response to an anticipated rise in 
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terrorism before the 2014 Sochi Olympics.  With a circulation of 87,000 papers across Moscow, 
it claims to be “one of the most authoritative and influential publications for Russia’s decision-
makers.”  Founded in 1989, the paper became Russia’s first business daily a few years later and 
expanded under the ownership of exiled oligarch, Boris Berezovksy.  In 2006, Alisher Usmanov, 
a steel magnate with holdings in state-controlled Gazprom, purchased the news outlet.  
Kommersant generally reports with a liberal slant more critical of the Russian government.104  
Kommersant published an article titled “Extreme Measures to Prepare for Extremists”105 
on 20 March 2013, which objectively discusses the newly proposed punishments for extremist 
groups in Tatarstan.  The news story begins with a thorough analysis of these amendments to the 
criminal code, which regional justice officials mean to enact “in consideration of the State 
Duma.”  Such euphemistic language suggests the federal center possibly coerced the regional 
government into imposing these legal changes, increasing term limits by multiple years and fines 
by hundreds of thousands of rubles for individuals convicted of extremism.  The article offers 
some justifications for the new laws in describing recent “manifestations of radical Islamic 
ideology” such as the Kazan terrorist attacks, the capture of a Salafi terrorist group in January, 
and illegal protests by Hizb-ut-Tahrir last year.  But the remainder of the text abruptly switches 
to interviews with multiple individuals severely critical of the proposed amendments.  Primarily, 
human rights activist Lev Ponomarev argues the “North Caucasus shows that repressive policies 
do not solve the problem” and predicts there “will be many more innocent convictions that will 
increase the number of terrorist attacks.”  In comparison to all the aforementioned news sources, 
Kommersant provides a more balanced view of the situation developing in the Volga-Ural region 
by incorporating many different opinions on the effectiveness of these legal changes. 
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By pushing for harsher laws against extremist groups in Tatarstan, the federal 
government aims to undermine projected threats of terrorism in the run-up to the 2014 Sochi 
Olympics.  Such revisions to the criminal code grant security forces extraordinary law 
enforcement powers, potentially infringing on the rights of religious minorities.  As discussed in 
the Nezavisimaya Gazeta article, the Tatarstan Spiritual Board of Muslims prefers teachings 
based in the Hanafi school of religious thought.  If deemed extremist in nature, moderate groups 
with different doctrinal interpretations face even more serious penalties for not following the 
standardized system or simply challenging the arbitrariness of police detentions.  Adherents of 
religious fundamentalism may also propagate these further injustices against their faith, enjoying 
more success in the recruitment of individuals frustrated with state policies.  As inferred from 
previously analyzed media sources, the trend of Islamic radicalization in the Volga-Ural region 
possibly increases as a consequence of government overreaction.  The outrage of local human 
rights activists suggests the federal center lacks legitimacy in taking such drastic measures 
against supposed extremists in the religious community of Tatarstan. 
The Russian language national newspaper Izvestia describes an incident of apparent 
retaliatory terrorism in response to the expansion of federal security operations.  With a present 
day circulation of about 235,000 papers in Moscow, it began as a small left-wing paper during 
the 1917 revolutions, quickly swinging across the aisle during the Soviet Union era.  In the 
1990s, their reporting revived a reputation as serious and independent; however, quality suffered 
after the sale to Gazprom-Media in 2004, the oil conglomerate with close ties to the state.106 
Despite having switched owners again, the slant tends to be to attack liberal opposition and the 
West.  The opinions expressed in Izvestia may best be attributed as more generally in line with 
the views of the Russian government. 
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On 21 October 2013, Izvestia published an article titled “Bandits Respond to Special 
Forces Operation with Terrorist Attack in Volgograd.”107 A 30 year-old female suicide bomber, 
Naida Asiyalova, detonated her explosives on a city bus, killing 6 people and critically injuring 
22 other passengers.  Her 22 year-old accomplice and husband, Dmitri Sokolov, organized two 
prior terrorist attacks in Dagestan.  After introducing the facts of the incident, the publication 
discusses the radicalization of Sokolov, stating the “Russian Wahhibist” to be of “even more 
interest.”  Details on his disappearance, recruitment, and hostilities abound without any reference 
to the background of Asiyalova.  Through the selection of such content, the article seems to 
sensationalize the threat of Islamic radicalization for ethnic Russians.  The next section 
emphasizes how the “special forces do not rule out that the terror attack in Volgograd was 
militants’ revenge for the latest successful operation in the North Caucasus,” proceeding to 
describe several other federal security operations in recent weeks.  The depth of detail provided 
on the tit for tat violence between the authorities and militants supports the presumption in the 
story headline. 
In a more objective manner, the article quotes General Lieutenant of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs (MVD), Alexander Gurov, who asserts the suicide bombing was “absolutely 
senseless,” not planned retaliatory terrorism.  Law enforcement officials prefer to stress their 
missions deter violence as opposed to incite more extremist activity.  Such a deflection aims to 
undermine the conclusion that federal government overreaction reinforces the trend of Islamic 
radicalization in Russia.  Another passage states that different security officials think the 
“terrorist attack could connect to the preparation for the Olympics in Sochi.”  Past KGB colonel, 
Oleg Nechiporenko, even predicts “after the terrorist attack the degree of tension will rise at the 
Olympics and the incident can push fanatical individuals to action, who will possibly perceive it 
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as a call to act.”  Former head of the Federal Security Service (FSB) criticizes the agency for 
placing too much attention on extremism, “forgetting terrorism,” and not surmising that militants 
may choose sites for terrorist attacks based on smaller security force presence.  These comments 
provide various insights into state apprehension over the Volgograd bus bombing less than two 
years after the similarly alarming Kazan terrorist attacks. 
 Through Constant Comparative Content Analysis of multiple Russian media sources, 
certain provisional conclusions on two core categories, federal security operations and influence 
of religious institutions, inform the trend of Islamic radicalization in the republics of Tatarstan 
and Bashkortostan as well as the government reaction to this movement.  The Kazan terrorist 
attacks greatly unnerve federal officials, who fear the spread of religious extremism to the 
historically peaceful Volga-Ural region.  Though news bulletins in NTV and Nezavisimaya 
Gazeta cite the frustration of many Muslims with local policies on hajj operations and doctrinal 
standardization, the religious communities of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan appear relatively 
stable with only the October security operation against two suspected terrorists as definitive 
proof of subsequent radical behavior following the July incident.  Reports from NTV and The 
Moscow Times still sensationalize a growing foreign influence from the Taliban-backed Bulgar-
Uyghur Jamaat to the Mujahedeen of Tatarstan.  The Kazan Herald article initially downplays 
the threat, soberly questioning the link between these groups and the Caucasus Emirate, but 
suggests federal government overreaction potentially bolsters Islamic radicalization in Russia.  
State-controlled Perviy Kanal and liberal Kommersant offer evidence of expanding federal 
security operations and proposed legal changes against extremist groups that threaten to alienate 
other Muslim populations.  In light of the Volgograd bus bombing discussed in Izvestia, the 
Russian government likely faces further dangers from religious extremism in the run-up to the 
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2014 Sochi Olympics and remains wary of expanding Islamic radicalization in the Volga-Ural 
region following the withdrawal of NATO forces from Central Asia.                 
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CHAPTER 6: ACQUISITION OF GREATER REGIONAL 
AUTONOMY THROUGH ETHNIC NATIONALISM 
Esteemed scholar Anthony D. Smith defines nationalism as the formation of “a named 
and self-defined community whose members cultivate common myths, memories, symbols and 
values, possess and disseminate a distinctive public culture, reside in and identify with a 
historical homeland, and create and disseminate common laws and shared customs.”108 The 
ethnic classification also involves emphasis on shared genealogical descent and perceived bonds 
of kinship between members of the group.109 This dynamic process of creating an imagined 
community and common identity deserves consideration in the context of the republics of 
Tatarstan and Bashkortostan.  Through the application of Constant Comparative Content 
Analysis, the following combination of Russian media sources relevant to two core categories, 
pursuit of regional autonomy and identity formation, illustrates the trend of ethnic nationalism in 
the Volga-Ural region.  Ultimately, though national separatist groups increased radical activity 
following the Kazan terrorist attacks, the regional governments strategically manipulate ethnic 
nationalism in order to secure greater autonomy from the federal center.    
The Russian language newspaper Izvestia published an article titled “100 People 
Protested Large-Scale Arrests in Center of Kazan”110 on 29 July 2012, a little over a week after 
the Kazan terrorist attacks, which describes the response of a major ethnic nationalist group to 
the consequences of the incident.  “Azatlyk,” a word of Turkic origin meaning “Freedom,” 
organized a protest of over 100 people to condemn the indiscriminate arrests of Muslims in 
Kazan amidst the Russian government efforts to apprehend the culprits of the car bombing and 
shooting.  In an interview with Izvestia, the leader of Azatlyk, Nail Nabiullin, equates such 
actions to “all-pervasive repression” of Muslims in Tatarstan.  Though a neutral tone permeates 
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the article, certain parts may be construed as showing favor to the Russian government.  The 
article begins by describing the protest as in defense of the detainees in the case of the terrorist 
attacks.  A passage near the end cites local media reporting hundreds of detainees, who police 
deem “likely perpetrators,” characterized as ideologues of radical Wahhabism or those in conflict 
with the Mufti’s and his deputies’ interests.    
Such a presentation of the facts creates an interesting association between a major ethnic 
nationalist group and Muslim detainees as Azatlyk defending the “likely perpetrators” of the 
Kazan terrorist attacks.  As touched upon in the history chapter, nationalists in the late Soviet 
Union often utilized Islam to unify the populace in bolstering their shared nationality.  Azatlyk 
likely promotes their frustration with the unfounded detention of multiple innocent Muslim 
Tatars to illustrate their perceived political plight, not to support religious extremism.  On the 
other hand, state-influenced Izvestia subtly implies that this ethnic nationalism actually 
reinforces the Islamic radicalism of the Kazan terrorist attacks.  Coloring the protests in this light 
gives the government legitimacy in tackling supposed radical elements in religious and 
nationalist camps.  The evident use of these strategies illustrates how the federal government 
actively works to suppress supposed extremism in the regions of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan.     
The Russian and English language Georgian newspaper Georgia Times elaborates on the 
issues discussed in Izvestia.  Unfortunately, no information is readily available on the history of 
the Georgia Times; however, archival data suggests that publications have occurred since 2008.  
Tense diplomatic relations between Russia and Georgia in recent years implies a bias more 
critical of Kremlin policies.  The brief 2008 Russo-Georgian War over South Ossetia supports 
this claim. 
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An opinion piece titled “Tatar nationalists are losing ground,”111 published in the Georgia 
Times on 23 October 2012, gives an in-depth analysis of the role Azatlyk serves following the 
Kazan terrorist attacks.  An interview with Nail Nabiullin reveals useful information on the 
origins and operations of Azatlyk.  Nabiullin secured leadership thanks to his family connection 
with writer Fauzia Bayramova, known as the “grandmother of Tatar nationalism.”  He was 
expelled from school multiple times for his nationalist ideas, imagining the future of Tatarstan in 
a state stretching from the Caucasus to Lake Baikal with help from Turkey, Azerbaijan, and 
Georgia. 
This article incorporates the views of Vasili Ivanov, a security specialist at the state-
backed Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISI), who believes Nabiullin remains semi-
successful because the “Kazan Kremlin” wishes to exaggerate the threat of national separatism 
for bargaining power with Moscow.  He claims the Tatar bureaucracy is even providing financial 
support for Azatlyk in the form of rent for their office, legal aid, and print materials.  If this 
assertion bears some semblance of truth, then the regional government may be backing ethnic 
nationalist groups in order to secure more concessions from the federal center.  Such a state of 
affairs implies that intentional political machinations precipitate the appearance of present-day 
ethnic nationalism, not a growing movement of Tatar or Bashkir individuals developing a 
national identity outside of the Russian Federation.  
Another RISI expert, Yana Amelin, suggests radical Islam represents a greater threat than 
national separatism in Tatarstan, citing conclusions of the American Foreign Policy Council who 
visited in 2010.  The Georgia Times proceeds to speculate on the ambitions of Azatlyk deputy of 
ideology, Airat Shakirov, a Salafi preacher better known as Sheikh Umar and one of seven 
officially arrested for questioning regarding the Kazan terrorist attacks.  His close connection 
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with Nabiullin seemingly suggests the potential “transformation of a very young man from 
moderate Hanafi into armed Wahhabi-Salafist may occur for a short time.”  Though proposing a 
decline in ethnic nationalism, the Georgia Times debatably exaggerates the radicalization of the 
moderate Azatlyk likely to accentuate the internal security problems of Russia in dealing with 
Islamic radicalization. 
The Russian and English language news portal Kavkaz Center supports the connection 
between national separatists and religious extremists similarly presented in reports from Izvestia 
and Georgia Times.  Founded in the city of Grozny in Chechnya in 1999, it serves as the primary 
media wing for the Caucasus Emirate, a militant network in the North Caucasus.112 Movladi 
Udugov, former Minister of Information for Chechnya and top propagandist for the Caucasus 
Emirate, currently controls the website.  Naturally, the opinions expressed often harshly criticize 
policies of the Russian government and overtly call for the creation of an Islamic state in Russia.  
The Russian government considers all information on Kavkaz Center to be extremist and terrorist 
material. 
Kavkaz Center posted an article headlined “In Kazan Protest of Muslim Peoples Against 
Robberies of Moscow”113 on 25 January 2013 praising the activities of Azatlyk in unsurprisingly 
stark contrast to the skepticism presented in Nezavisimaya Gazeta.  In this interview, Nabiullin 
places particular emphasis on Batu Khan as the true founder of the federation, aiming to establish 
the historical legitimacy of the Tatar people.  He announces Azatlyk will be holding protests 
across the country on days honoring the burnings of major Russian cities during the Golden 
Horde era.  A thorough outreach campaign involving the distribution of books and calendars 
coupled with public lectures and presentations on Batu Khan is described as well.  Kavkaz 
Center uses harsh rhetoric throughout the article with phrases such as the “ungrateful Russian 
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occupiers” and the “battle against the common Russian enemy.”  The piece concludes with a 
brief reference to the recent formation of an alliance between Azatlyk and a Bashkir nationalist 
group called Kuk Bure.  As the news wing of a terrorist network, the Kavkaz Center support for 
Azatlyk activities suggests interplay between the trends of Islamic radicalization and ethnic 
nationalism. 
The Russian language regional newspaper Svobodnoe Slovo verifies the operational 
cooperation between Tatar Azatlyk and Bashkir Kuk Bure after the Kazan terrorist attacks.  This 
online publication claims to “talk without censorship about politics in the Chuvash republic and 
Russia.”114 With the oldest article dating back only a few years, it is likely a fairly unknown 
news outlet.  However, the location of Chuvashia directly west of Tatarstan suggests the website 
shares insightful opinions on the Kazan area and in opposition to the Russian government. 
On 8 December 2012, Svobodnoe Slovo published an article titled “In Seven Russian 
Republics Actions Held In Defense of National Languages.”115 Tatar Azatlyk attracted close to 
50 people in Kazan while Kuk Bure organized a protest in Ufa to protect the Bashkir language.  
The last passage criticizes a new federal law, which “guarantees the obtainment of education in 
the Russian language.”  Since language represents a crucial tool of mobilization for identity 
formation, Tatar and Bashkir ethnic nationalist groups feel threatened by perceived cultural 
homogenization policies of the Russian government.  In marked contrast to Izvestia and Georgia 
Times, Svobodnoe Slovo portrays these protestors as peaceful activists, not as nationalist 
separatists on the verge of radicalizing like religious extremists of the Kazan terrorist attacks.  
The Russian language national newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta expounds on the 
political exploitation of ethnic nationalism initially mentioned in Georgia Times.  On 15 January 
2013, Nezavisimaya Gazeta published an article titled “The Second Invasion of Batu,”116 
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discussing the activities of Azatlyk for the year 2013.  Notably, the piece begins by categorizing 
the group members as “radical Tatar nationalists.”  Such a characterization readily relates to the 
Izvestia underlying association between Azatlyk and the “likely perpetrators” of the Kazan 
terrorist attacks and interestingly compares with the Georgia Times assessment of Azatlyk as still 
more moderate but harboring the potential to radicalize.  Despite hastily labeling the group as 
radicals, Nezavisimaya Gazeta downgrades the influence of Azatlyk with an underhanded tone.  
Nabiullin shares in an interview that Azatlyk has declared 2013 as the year of Batu Khan, a ruler 
during the Golden Horde empire, to remember the greats periods of history for the Volga-Ural 
peoples.  Unlike the Kavkaz Center, Nezavisimaya Gazeta critically comments that Batu Khan 
was actually an initiator of the destruction for Volga Bulgaria, the cradle of the Tatar nation.  
This observation shows how Azatlyk actively constructs and integrates more suitable heroes in 
history to bolster their modern day national identity.  Since Batu Khan was clearly not Russian, 
the Tatar nationalists may claim him as their own savior from the past. 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta further attacks the credibility of Azatlyk later in the article.  
Despite intentions to distribute 150,000 calendars and 2,000 books describing the glories of Batu 
Khan, the opponents of Azatlyk are reported as not taking their initiatives seriously.  The next 
passage still argues that the followers of the radical nationalists are not weakening but will 
become stronger.  In a similar vein to the Georgia Times, Nezavisimaya Gazeta explains the 
“Kazan Kremlin” uses the radicals to play political games with Moscow.  This again implies the 
Tatar bureaucracy exploits ethnic nationalism as a bargaining chip for negotiations with the 
federal center, serving as the main impetus for bolstering the imagined community of Azatlyk.  
The article ends somewhat ominously in claiming that such political maneuvering represents the 
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last attempts of the “Kazan Kremlin” before President Putin eliminates the autonomous 
republics. 
On 8 August 2013, another Nezavisimaya Gazeta article titled “Carte Blanche: Tatar Call 
to Unite Once Again”117 further discusses the political manipulation of ethnic nationalism for 
stronger regional autonomy.  The report begins with the announcement that the President of 
Tatarstan, Rustam Minnihanov, developed a “new conception of national politics,” making 
Kazan the “spiritual center of all the Tatar people.”  Such a bold claim directly challenges the 
federal mandate to support ethnic minorities in the federation.  The next passage describes the 
past constructive relationship between the former President of Tatarstan, Mintimer Shaimiev, 
and “radical national separatists” in their quest for sovereignty during the early 1990s.  But once 
the federal center offered complete freedom, “carte blanche,” to local elites, regional support for 
ethnic nationalists diminished. 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta argues that President Minnihanov should chart a “new political 
course” away from the earlier legacy of former President Shaimiev but admits his recent policies 
on national politics do not greatly differ from those of old.  Such a subjective tone signals 
disapproval more in line with the federal center.  The increase in places to study the Tatar 
language also shows the reinforcement of Tatar identity.  Tatar officials clearly responded to the 
Azatlyk protests highlighted in Svobodnoe Slovo.  In light of these developments, the article 
concludes with speculation over whether the regional government strives to “receive maximum 
political freedoms in exchange for the elimination of ghostly separatist threats.”  This analysis 
offers evidence of attempts to acquire greater regional autonomy through ethnic nationalism in 
Tatarstan.   
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The Russian language national news portal REGNUM provides proof of similar 
initiatives in Bashkortostan.  Started in 1999, this online publication covers issues in Russia, 
Eastern Europe, and Central Asia.  The website describes itself as a “federal news agency.”  In 
an interview last year, editor-in-chief, Vigen Akopyan, explained the mission of the media outlet 
involves opposing fascism and policies in conflict with Russia.118 Thus, REGNUM likely crafts 
articles more in line with the views of the Russian government. 
REGNUM published an article headlined “In Ufa Parents of Students Complained To 
Prosecutor of Officials Sabotaging the Language Question”119 on 13 September 2013.  Despite 
the federal mandate discussed in Svobodnoe Slovo, the Minister of Education in Bashkortostan, 
Alfis Gaizov, announced in early September that students in Russian language schools will study 
the Bashkir language.  Furthermore, he states that parents reserve the right to choose the 
language of study for the schools of their children.  But parents attest that administrative officials 
“rudely intervene in the school process,” imposing the “study of Russian language and 
literature.”  Interviewees express frustration with the conflicting judgments of the regional 
Bashkir ministry and local Russian administrators.  REGNUM provides an objective look at the 
growing tension along ethnic nationalist lines between the federal center, regional government, 
and educational institutions in Bashkortostan a year after the Kazan terrorist attacks. 
The Russian language national newspaper Novaya Gazeta describes a key federal 
government response to the recent impunity of the regional governments.  With a circulation of 
171,000 papers, it publishes twice a week. In June 2006, former Soviet leader Mikhail 
Gorbachev and businessman Alexander Lebedev purchased the paper from the staff.  The 
publication enjoys a high reputation for investigative journalism and often criticizes the Russian 
government for their policies in the North Caucasus.120 Though speculation abounds, most 
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suspect the state sponsored the assassinations of Novaya Gazeta journalists, Anna Politkovskaya 
and Yury Shchekochikhin, for their high-profile reporting. 
On 15 September 2013, Novaya Gazeta published an article titled “In Kazan Activists of 
the Tatar Nationalist Movement Began Indefinite Political Hunger Strike.”121 The report details 
how city officials evicted Azatlyk and the All-Tatar Societal Center from their building of 
operations for the last 17 years.  The groups decided to partake in a more radical protest, 
beginning an “indefinite hunger strike” to propagate their grievances.  Commenting on the 
situation, the participants believe the seizure of the building is a “political provocation” meant to 
hasten the “elimination of the Republic of Tatarstan” and the “final assimilation of Tatar and 
non-Russian peoples.”  As a result of nationality policies specified in Nezavisimaya Gazeta and 
REGNUM, the federal center likely pressured the regional governments to shut down Azatlyk.  
Such action suggests federal government apprehension over the bolstered ethnic nationalism in 
Tatarstan and Bashkortostan.  Furthermore, selecting the hunger strike strategy signals more 
radical behavior on the part of nationalist separatists, possibly seeking the path of martyrdom 
similar to religious extremists.  
 After analyzing the Kazan terrorist attacks through the core categories of identity 
formation and pursuit of regional autonomy, certain provisional conclusions emerge on the 
developing trend of ethnic nationalism in the republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan and the 
government reaction to this movement.  Primarily, the resurgence of the Tatar nationalist group 
Azatlyk in the national spotlight appears to be the most noticeable effect of the July incident.  As 
detailed in Izvestia, the indiscriminate detentions of several Muslims created a rallying point for 
rejuvenated ethnic nationalism and justifiable frustration with the Russian government.  Reports 
from Kavkaz Center and Nezavisimaya Gazeta discussed how Azatlyk also initiated a well-timed 
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outreach campaign in declaring 2013 as the year of Batu Khan to fuel Tatar solidarity amidst the 
outrage with the federal center.  The Svobodnoe Slovo article offers evidence of a budding 
alliance between two ethnic minorities youth groups with a history of suspicion and mistrust, 
Tatar Azatlyk and Bashkir Kuk Bure.  The collaboration suggests trans-republican identity 
formation across the Volga-Ural region.  
However, Georgia Times and Nezavisimaya Gazeta assert that Azatlyk does not pose a 
serious threat to the internal security of Russia since the Kazan Kremlin often supports the 
activities of the group in order to have more leverage in negotiating with Moscow.  REGNUM 
presents similar attempts by the government of Bashkortostan to manipulate ethnic nationalism 
for greater regional autonomy.  This implies separatist movements represent the lesser of two 
threats in comparison to a potential rise in Islamic radicalization.  It is crucial to emphasize that 
these two trends are not mutually exclusive.  Despite claims that the activities of Azatlyk are 
regionally controlled, the primary propaganda wing of the Chechen rebels continues to back their 
efforts.  A high-ranking member of Azatlyk even ended up as a key suspect in the Kazan terrorist 
attacks. 
As described in Svobodnoe Slovo, Azatlyk mostly operates in the realm of peaceful 
political activism; however, if such demonstrations become larger and subsequently repressed by 
the Tatar bureaucracy under orders from the federal center, then political violence may become 
the only alternative to address their grievances.  Through the help of the media, the groundwork 
for an imagined community associating ethnic nationalists with religious extremists already 
exists in articles of Izvestia, Georgia Times, Nezavisimaya, and Kavkaz Center.  Increased 
government backlash only gives further recognition to this constructed reality.  In response to the 
seizure of their base of operations, the Azatlyk hunger strike reported in Novaya Gazeta 
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represents more radical behavior on par with common strategies of terrorist groups.  Presently, 
the Tatar and Bashkir separatist movements remain relatively small as the regional governments 
strategically control ethnic nationalism to acquire stronger political sovereignty in the Russian 
Federation.  
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
As evidenced in the widespread media coverage associated with the Kazan terrorist 
attacks, the following conclusions emerge on the trends of Islamic radicalization and ethnic 
nationalism in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan as well as the government reaction to these 
developments.  First, outside of a few isolated incidents, the religious communities of both 
republics appear relatively stable, not increasingly radicalizing to commit political violence from 
frustration with new policies of local spiritual leaders.  But increasing federal security operations 
to secure the 2014 Sochi Olympics and resurging Islamic terrorism following the NATO 
withdrawal from Central Asia threaten to alienate more Volga-Ural Muslim individuals.  Second, 
though national separatist groups increased radical activity following the Kazan terrorist attacks, 
the regional governments of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan strategically manipulate ethnic 
nationalism to acquire greater autonomy from the federal center.  Supported by the underlying 
implications of the aforementioned Russian media sources, credible threats of religious 
extremism and national separatism presently exist on only a small scale in the Volga-Ural region 
but harbor the potential to grow in the near future.     
Recent research conducted by the Foundation for Civil Society Development also 
confirms the relative peace and security of the Volga-Ural region in recent years.  On 15 August 
2013, this Russian non-governmental organization, “whose main focus of research is in the fields 
of politics, regional development, and contemporary media,” released a study on the social well-
being of citizens across the Russian republics.122 The results provide interesting insights into the 
stability of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan.  Both territories received the highest ratings with over 
65% of interviewees content with their social well-being in the Volga-Ural region.  By 
comparison, the republics of the North Caucasus, Volgograd, and even Moscow all earned lower 
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scores.  Notably, the 56,900 responses were collected in February and May of 2012 before the 
Kazan terrorist attacks.  Amidst potentially increasing trends of Islamic radicalization and ethnic 
nationalism from government overreaction, foreign extremist influence, and political 
manipulation, this national poll suggests the Muslim populations of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan 
remain largely content with their standard of living.  The survey data implies the majority of 
Tatar and Bashkir individuals reject calls for national separatism and religious extremism in the 
run-up to the 2014 Sochi Olympics and the imminent withdrawal of NATO forces from Central 
Asia. 
In conclusion, this study establishes the necessary academic groundwork to inform future 
research on the trends of Islamic radicalization and ethnic nationalism in the republics of 
Tatarstan and Bashkortostan as well as the government reaction to a potential rise in extremism.  
I believe the qualitative methodology of Constant Comparative Content Analysis served as a 
semi-effective initial framework for addressing government bias and news sensationalism in 
Russian media to draw accurate conclusions on these topics of interest.  However, conducting 
interviews and disseminating surveys in the field represent the next steps of this research in order 
to more thoroughly assess the threats of religious extremism and national separatism in the 
Volga-Ural region.  I intend to return to Tatarstan and Bashkortostan to expand on the work 
presented in this senior honors thesis.  In the wake of the Kazan terrorist attacks and Boston 
Marathon bombings, the continuation of this project aims to contribute to the growing body of 
research on the dangers of ethnic minority conflicts for Russian internal security and the 
international community.               
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